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Abstract   This study utilises recent advances in statistical models for social networks to identify the factors 
shaping heroin trafficking in relation to European countries. First, it estimates the size of the heroin flows among 
a network of 61 countries, before subsequently using a latent space approach to model the presence of trafficking 
and the amount of heroin traded between any two given countries. Many networks, such as trade networks, are 
intrinsically weighted, and ignoring edge weights results in a loss of relevant information. Traditionally, the gravity 
model has been used to predict legal trade flows, assuming conditional independence among observations. More 
recently, latent space position models for social networks have been used to analyze legal trade among countries, 
and, mutatis mutandis, can be applied to the context of illegal trade to count both edge weights and conditional 
dependence among observations. These models allow for a better understanding of the generative processes and 
potential evolution of heroin trafficking routes. This study shows that geographical and social proximity provide 
fertile ground for the formation of heroin flows. Opportunities are also a driver of drug flows towards countries 
where regulation of corruption is weak. 
Highlights   
• Directed, weighted network of bilateral heroin trade to and within Europe. 
• Use of latent space position models to identify the determinants of heroin trade. 
• Geographical and social proximity facilitates bilateral heroin trade. 
• Heroin flows towards countries with weak regulation of corruption. 
Keywords   Heroin Trafficking; Latent space; Gravity model; Social proximity. 
Introduction 
Transnational drug trafficking is an illicit activity that involves exchanges between actors in different 
countries (Naylor, 2003; Paoli et al., 2009). As such, international drug flows can be analyzed in terms 
of a network of economic relationships between countries; hence, models designed for bilateral legal 
trade can be adapted to identify their determinants. Previous studies have documented how drug 
trafficking is concentrated within a limited number of particular routes, and that countries thus have a 
limited number of trading partners compared to legal trade networks (Boivin, 2013, 2014a; EMCDDA 
and EUROPOL, 2013; UNODC, 2015a). However, there is a relative dearth of information concerning 
the determinants of the routes used to supply drugs to the European markets. 
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This study addresses the lacunae in extant research by identifying the determinants of heroin flows 
to and within Europe. It estimates the amount of heroin trafficked between European countries and non-
European countries importing from or exporting to Europe. Finally, through recourse to criminologica l 
and economic theories the study identifies the factors that may influence heroin trafficking, before 
adopting a latent space approach to model both the presence and the amount of heroin flows between 
countries. Analysing international heroin trade as a directed, weighted network represents a more 
accurate description of the complexity of the phenomenon than its binary counterparts (Boivin, 2014b; 
Chandra and Joba, 2015). 
The article is structured as follows. The next section reviews extant literature on drug trafficking 
networks. The third section discusses the respective options for modelling illicit flows between 
countries. The fourth section presents the manifold factors underpinning international drug trafficking, 
and outlines the theoretical framework adopted in the study. The fifth section introduces the data and 
the methodology before presenting the main results in the penultimate section. The final section provides 
a conclusion and recommendations for policy makers. 
Background 
International drug trafficking generates considerable profits and represents one of the primary sources 
of income for criminal organizations. For example, the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime 
(UNODC) estimates that cross-national trafficking of heroin along the Balkan route solely is worth 
between USD 6.7 and 10 billion (UNODC, 2015b). The estimate rises to USD 28 billion per annum 
when consumption and production are included, and is exponentially higher yet still if drug-related 
expenditure is added up (e.g. health costs, enforcement costs). Indeed, heroin consumption continues to 
account for a substantive share of drug-related health and social costs in Europe (EMCDDA, 2015a), 
with the number of overdose deaths recently increasing along with the purity of heroin available in 
European markets (EMCDDA, 2015a), which goes some way to explaining why heroin is considered 
the most harmful illicit psychoactive substance in Europe (van Amsterdam et al., 2015). 
Despite the magnitude of the problem, and the undoubted interest of practitioners and scholars, there 
remains little systematic research on drug flows between countries. Historically, the lack of data has 
been the principal factor hindering quantitative studies in this field. However, over the course of the last 
decade governments and international institutions have collected and provided a considerable amount 
of data on international drug trafficking, such as wholesale prices, seizures and purity (Chandra and 
Joba, 2015). These datasets constitute an unprecedented source of information that scholars have begun 
to use for the purposes of understanding how illicit drugs move across countries. 
Data on drug flows are relational in nature, and, as such, are well suited for applying social network 
analysis methods (Boivin, 2013). Having said this, hitherto only a small amount of recent studies have 
adopted a network approach to analyze drug trafficking flows between countries (Boivin, 2014a, 2014b, 
2013; Chandra and Joba, 2015; Giommoni et al., 2017). This is emblematic of both the recent availability 
of data, and criminologists’ emergent interest in social network analysis methods to analyze the 
properties of illicit networks, including drug trade networks (see Carrington, 2011; Bouchard and Malm, 
2016 for a review). 
Thus far, the literature has provided two key contributions to the network analysis of international 
drug trafficking. The first contribution derives from a series of papers by Boivin (2014a, 2013), who 
uses macrosocial network analysis to both identify the role of countries with respect to drug flows, and 
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to understand the structural properties of heroin, cocaine and cannabis trafficking networks. Boivin’s 
(2013, 2014a) analysis of the networks— originally developed from data on seizures between 1998 and 
2007— provides two main findings. First, that the trafficking of illicit drugs has a more ad hoc structure 
in comparison with the trade of legal commodities (e.g. coffee and chocolate). Second, that core 
countries within the legal economy tend to occupy peripheral positions within the international trade of 
illicit drugs. In a further paper, Boivin (2014b) analyses the wholesale prices of cocaine, heroin, and 
cannabis in an attempt to explain price mark-ups. OLS regression models were used to test the influence 
of country-level variables (e.g. level of corruption, flow betweenness score) and relational variables (e.g. 
geographical distance, direction of trade) on price mark-ups between any two given countries. The 
results show that some characteristics of the importer (e.g. risk of arrest), when viewed in conjunction 
with the position of the country within the global trafficking network, can predict wholesale price mark-
ups (Boivin, 2014b). 
Chandra and colleagues provide the second key contribution to the network analysis of drug 
trafficking flows (Chandra et al., 2011; Chandra and Barkell, 2012; Chandra and Joba, 2015; Chandra 
et al., 2016). The authors use wholesale prices reported by the UNODC between 2000 and 2008 to infer 
the presence and direction of transnational flows of heroin (Chandra and Barkell, 2012) and cocaine 
(Chandra et al., 2011) for seventeen western European countries. The results of the analysis are 
mobilized to build two directed, binary networks of the international trafficking of heroin and cocaine 
in Europe (Chandra and Joba, 2015). The overlap between the two networks is limited, most likely due 
to differences in the geographical location of cocaine and heroin producing countries. For instance, the 
heroin trade network has more redundant ties and is more diffused than the cocaine network, leading the 
authors to conclude that it may be more resilient to interventions geared towards reducing the supply 
(Chandra and Joba, 2015). Recently, Chandra et al. (2016) used the same method to document 
trafficking patterns using MDMA wholesale prices in 59 US cities, identifying, in particular, the key 
role of border and coastal cities in this illegal market. This study is especially relevant as it focuses on 
cities, rather than countries, as nodes in a drug trafficking network. 
The studies summarized above share a common feature: they analyze networks with binary flow data, 
i.e. networks that report information on whether the drug flows between any two given countries are 
present or absent. A recent study on the supply of heroin to Europe also analyzed trading relationships 
between countries in terms of binary network ties, using Exponential Random Graph Models (ERGM) 
to identify the determinants of drug routes (Giommoni et al., 2016). There are two primary justifications 
for excluding edge weights from the network analysis of drug trade networks. First, the inclusion of 
information on quantities of drugs traded between any two countries entails estimating the scale of illicit 
drug markets. This is not a straightforward endeavor, especially if the focus is on more than one country 
(Kilmer et al., 2015, 2011). Second, most statistical models for networks do not allow for the inclusion 
of edge weights in the analysis (e.g. Caimo and Friel, 2014; Hunter et al., 2008). However, illicit 
trafficking networks are intrinsically weighted, and, thus, ignoring edge weights may result in a loss of 
relevant information (Newman, 2004). 
The studies adopting a network approach to the analysis of international drug trafficking proffer 
several insights about the phenomenon, but they are largely descriptive in nature. For example, they 
provide an account of the structure of the networks of international trafficking of heroin, cocaine and 
cannabis (e.g. density, countries’ centrality), but fail to explain what shapes and drives the flows of illicit 
drugs between countries. Gravity-type models and, more recently, latent space position models have 
been introduced to test theories on bilateral trade and can be applied to directed, weighted networks 
representing cross-country illicit activities, including international drug trafficking. 
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Models for illicit trade networks: gravity and latent space position models 
Over the course of the last decade, social network analysis has proven its expedience for both refining 
criminological concepts and theories, and assisting law enforcement agencies in enforcing and 
preventing crime. That said, most research is descriptive in nature and focuses on the influence of 
personal and neighborhood networks on crime, and on the organization of criminal groups (see 
Calderoni, 2014; Carrington, 2011; Haynie and Soller, 2014; Papachristos, 2014 for a review). Illicit 
activities often involve the smuggling of goods or persons across countries. Human trafficking and 
smuggling, illicit firearms trafficking, trade-based money laundering are all archetypal examples of 
cross-country illicit activities that can be analyzed as networks (e.g. Ferwerda et al., 2011; Hernandez 
and Rudolph, 2015). As with drug trafficking, issues with the uniformity of available data has limited 
quantitative studies on these cross-country illicit activities. When such information is readily available,  
the determinants of illicit flows are identified using the same estimation strategies used for bilateral legal 
trade, i.e. gravity-type models (Akee et al., 2014; Ferwerda et al., 2011; Hernandez and Rudolph, 2015; 
Wiseman and Walker, 2017). 
The gravity model postulates that the amount of traded goods and services moving between any two 
countries is proportional to the product of their size (or economic mass) divided by their geographica l 
distance, with a country’s size ordinarily being measured in terms of their gross domestic product (GDP) 
or market capitalization (Feenstra et al., 2001; Head and Mayer, 2014; Linnemann, 1966; Pöyhönen, 
1963). The gravity model was first developed by Savage and Deutsch (1960), who put forward a model 
to understand transaction flows, using data on bilateral trade to demonstrate its application. The first 
empirical study was published two years later, when Tinbergen (1962) modelled bilateral trade flows so 
as to analyze international trade between 42 countries. Other covariates were subsequently added to the 
model (e.g. dummy variables for neighboring countries) without reducing the explanatory power of the 
main variables (i.e. size and distance). The gravity model also demonstrated its explanatory power in 
the case of trade flows at a subnational level; McCallum (1995), for example, found that the exchange 
of commodities between any two provinces and states of the US and Canada is proportional to their size 
and distance, and is influenced by whether they share a border. 
In the case of studies on bilateral trade, the gravity model is usually estimated in terms of natural 
logarithms, and takes the following form: 
ln(𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖 ,𝑗) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖 ,𝑗 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝑍𝑖 ,𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑗 (1) 
where 𝛽𝑛  are the parameter estimates, 𝑀𝑖  and 𝑀𝑗  are the respective sender and receiver economic 
masses, 𝐷𝑖 ,𝑗 the distance between i and j, 𝑍𝑖,𝑗  other covariates, and 𝜖𝑖 ,𝑗 the residual error. 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are 
expected to be greater than zero, whereas 𝛽3 is expected to be lower than zero (Ward and Hoff, 2007). 
The coefficient of distance has traditionally been applied as a proxy for transaction costs. More 
specifically, some authors have posited that distance represents informational asymmetry between any 
two given countries, which, in turn, increases transaction costs (Portes et al., 2001; Portes and Rey, 
2005). Indeed, when one controls for telephone communication among countries, the negative effect of 
geographical distance on trade is reduced. Given that distance does not solely act as a proxy for 
transaction costs, the gravity model can be used to analyze other types of bilateral economic 
relationships, such as cross-border equity flows. Studies on Foreign Portfolio Investment (FDI) holdings 
have demonstrated that trade and equity holdings are in fact correlated, and that distance negatively 
affects both (Aviat and Coeurdacier, 2007). 
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Although the literature which adopts gravity-type models to analyze bilateral illicit flows is small, it 
is nevertheless focused on a variety of forms of illicit international trade. Gravity-type models were first 
adopted to estimate money laundering (Walker, 1995; Walker and Unger, 2009). The share of proceeds 
of crime generated in country i and transferred to country j is influenced by the mass and ‘attractiveness’ 
of country j, in addition to the distance between the two countries. The mass of j is measured as the per 
capita Gross National Product (GNP), whilst attractiveness is the sum of several weighted factors, 
including banking secrecy, governmental attitudes, and levels of corruption. Since data on bilateral 
money laundering flows are not available, the model cannot be tested empirically, which both raises 
doubts about its effectiveness, and impedes the statistical estimation of the attractiveness parameters 
(Ferwerda et al., 2013; Reuter, 2013). Recently, Ferwerda et al. (2013) tested both Walker’s original 
model and a traditional gravity model expanded by attractiveness variables, using a subset of money 
laundering data, i.e. trading-based money laundering data on flows from the US to 199 other countries. 4 
The former ‘perform[ed] badly’ (Ferwerda et al., 2013, p. 3178), whereas the latter identified licit trade, 
distance, shared borders, and the importing country’s GDP and multilateral cooperation in the fight 
against money laundering as factors which explain bilateral trading-based money laundering. 
Wiseman and Walker (2017) recently adopted a gravity model to analyze the relationship between 
underground trade flows between US states and these particular states’ policies on marijuana 
decriminalization. Underground trade flow between state i and state j is modeled as a function of the 
shadow economy value for state j, a vector of controls— including the demand for illicit drugs, the rate 
of police officers to public employees, and level of public official corruption in state j— and the distance 
between the two states. Two dummy variables also identified whether states i and j allow for legal 
exceptions for medical marijuana. A similar approach was used by Akee et al. (2014) in order to model 
transnational human trafficking. The authors specifically adopted a modified gravity model that 
specified trafficking as a function of per capita GDP and geographical distance, and which also included 
country-specific legislation (i.e. prostitution laws in source and host countries, and the provision for 
legal amnesty to trafficked victims in the latter) in an attempt to account for push and pull forces.5 The 
results demonstrated that legislation prohibiting prostitution had a positive impact on trafficking in both 
source and destination countries, most likely due to an inelastic demand of trafficked victims. 
Legislation has also been shown to affect the interstate flow of crime guns: another study adopting a 
gravity approach looked at the interstate movement of guns recovered at crime scenes in the US, and 
found that differences in state gun laws impacted on the exportation of illegal guns (Kahane, 2013). The 
interstate flow of crime guns is also positively associated with the economic mass of the states 
involved— measured by the states’ GDP— and inversely proportionate to their distance. 
These studies suggest that a gravity approach may also be expedient for analyzing bilateral drug trade, 
and that the amount of drugs traded between any two given countries can similarly be modeled as a 
function of their size, geographical distance, and other covariates. In the case of cross-country illicit 
activities for example, the measurement of a country’s size within previous research has varied 
according to the particular good or service that is being illegally exchanged. In the case of international 
drug trafficking, the size may be measured by the estimated illicit gross profit of the countries involved 
in the trade. Alternatively, the number or prevalence of drug users may be used to measure the size of a 
                                                             
4 The attractiveness variables included: corruption; a dummy variable indicating whether a country’s financial institutions are 
SWIFT members; governmental attitudes towards money laundering; a country’s involvement in conflicts; banking secrecy; a 
dummy variable indicating membership of the Egmont group (i.e. a multilateral co-operation agreement to fight money 
laundering); financial sector size (measured as deposits); and physical and cultural distance. 
5 Other control variables include, among other things, shared borders, mortality rate, literacy rate, and unemployment. 
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country’s consumer market. Assuming that the drug flows are driven by economic profit, i.e. from 
lower-income to higher-income countries, the GDP or per capita GDP can also be used as a proxy for 
countries’ economic mass in the case of international drug trade, although past research suggests that 
legal and illegal trade networks have significant differences (Boivin, 2013). In the case of the former, 
core countries are involved in most exchanges and largely trade with other core countries. In the case of 
the latter, peripheral countries in legal trade are often drug producing countries, and, as such, are more 
heavily involved within the drug trade, whereas core countries in legal trade are dependent on peripheral 
countries for their supply of plant-based drugs, such as heroin and cocaine. Consequently, many 
exchanges occur between different categories of countries and are directed toward the core, rather than 
being concentrated among core countries (Boivin, 2013). 
Notwithstanding these issues pertaining to differences between legal and illegal trade, the gravity 
approach to heroin flows also raises some important methodological concerns. The main limitation of 
the gravity model is that it assumes that all observations are independent, yet ‘when modelling 
international trade, the assumption of conditional independence is difficult to sustain even in the 
presence of directed country or dyad fixed effects’ (Ward et al., 2013, p. 96). Country-specific exporter 
and importer effects are also ignored in this model, although they were found to be large and persistent 
over time. International commerce is also asymmetric, with a small number of countries accounting for 
most of the trade, which means that some countries are included several times in the data, so that the 
assumption that trade-flows from the same country are independent cannot be considered valid (Ward 
and Hoff, 2007). Moreover, the gravity model ordinarily is fitted using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), 
whose estimates can be problematic in a network in which many observations are zeros (Mazur et al.,  
2015). 
A second issue concerns the generalizability of the results beyond the timespan considered in the 
analyses. Most studies tend to analyze trade flows over a yearly period or over the course of a number 
of years; however, such data does not constitute a random sample, but, rather, includes all exchanges 
recorded in the period under consideration in the analyses. The relationship between trade flows and the 
independent variables may change over time. To address these issues, some authors suggest evaluating 
the explanatory power and the temporal persistence of a set of independent variables based on out-of-
sample predictive performance, that estimates the validity of the model using a random sample from the 
database (‘training set’), and predicting the values for its complement (‘test set’) (Ward and Hoff, 2007). 
This method has recently been adopted by Mazur and colleagues (2015) to identify patterns in Foreign 
Portfolio Investment (FPI) holdings that can be generalized across time. 
Some studies have tried to overcome these aforesaid issues in relation to legal trade by incorporating 
relational information (e.g. alliances) into a regression framework, in conjunction with using the 
traditional gravity model with a series of covariates. Haim (2016) posits that we should cluster standard 
errors so as to adjust for dependencies in the data. Dependency is partly taken into account by linear 
mixed-models that incorporate both sender and receiver random effects. In this particular case, only 
observations with different sender or receiver countries are considered independent. Nonetheless, higher 
order dependencies— i.e. reciprocity, transitivity, balance, and clusterability— are not taken into 
account within this class of models (Mazur et al., 2015). To cite an example, transitivity captures the 
‘friend of a friend is a friend’ logic. That is to say, if country i trades with country j, and country j trades 
with country k, then the probability of a flow of goods between i and k is higher than that between i and 
a random fourth country that has no prior involvement in a trade relationship. Higher order dependencies 
can be taken into account by assigning each country a position in a ‘social space,’ based on its 
(unobserved) characteristics and the presence of other ties. Conditional independence between 
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observations can then subsequently be assumed, given the countries’ latent position within the social 
space (Hoff et al., 2002). 
Latent position models for social networks were introduced by Hoff, Raftery and Handcock (2002), 
before being extended to weighted networks (Hoff, 2005; Sewell and Chen, 2016). Such models 
postulate the existence of a ‘social space’ of unobserved latent characteristics. They assume that each 
node has an unknown position in the social space of characteristics, and that the distance between two 
nodes decreases as their characteristics become more similar. They then model the probability of a 
connection between two nodes as a function of the distance between their latent space positions, i.e.  
their positions in the social space of characteristics. Consequently, nodes are conditionally independent 
given their positions in the social space (Hoff et al., 2002; Krivitsky and Handcock, 2008). In the case 
of a trade network, latent space position models take the following form: 
𝑌𝑖 ,𝑗 ≡ ln(𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖 ,𝑗) = 𝑥𝑖,𝑗𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑢𝑗 + 𝑧𝑖𝑧𝑗
┬ + 𝜖𝑖 ,𝑗 (2) 
where 𝑥𝑖,𝑗 are fixed covariates, 𝛽 is the parameter estimates, 𝑢𝑖  and 𝑢𝑗  are the respective sender and 
receiver random effects, 𝑧𝑖𝑧𝑗
┬ are the latent space positions of i and j, and 𝜖𝑖 ,𝑗 the residual error (Krivitsky 
and Handcock, 2008; Mazur et al., 2015). 
Latent space position models thus enable researchers to take into consideration both edge weights 
and interdependencies among observations in the analysis of the generative processes and potential 
evolution of trade networks. Alternative approaches have been proposed, but they are either still under 
development (Denny et al., 2015; Desmarais and Cranmer, 2012; Wilson et al., 2015) or merely suitable 
for rank-order data (Krivitsky, 2012; Krivitsky and Butts, 2015). The use of Exponential Random Graph 
Models (ERGM) is instead suitable only in the case of binary network data, such as in the case of 
analyzing the network of alliances among countries (Cranmer et al., 2012). 
A relatively limited range of studies (Howell, 2013; Ward et al., 2013) combine the gravity model 
specification with latent space model covariates in order to capture higher order dependencies in world 
trade networks. Observations (i.e. edge values) are assumed to be stochastically independent, in light of 
the country’s latent positions in a k-dimensional social space. A similar approach is also used by Mazur 
et al. (2015) to analyze Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI) holdings, whereby the investment amount is 
classified in terms of edge weights. In addition to latent space model covariates, the authors, in 
accordance with Krivitsky et al. (2009), included random sender and receiver effects. Parameter 
estimates were obtained through a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) technique of Gibbs sampling 
over the covariates (Krivitsky and Handcock, 2008). This estimation strategy outperformed both linear 
models and linear mixed models that incorporate sender and receiver random effects (Mazur et al.,  
2015). 
Determinants and hypotheses 
Through utilizing the gravity model as the starting point from which to describe international trade, we 
postulate that the amount of traded heroin between any two given countries is a function of their size or 
economic mass, and their geographical distance. However, several other factors can also explain the 
intensity and direction of international heroin trafficking. Studies from a variety of disciplinary 
backgrounds are expedient, directly or indirectly, for providing insights into the geographica l 
configuration of international drug trade flows (e.g. Kleemans and van De Bunt, 1999; Paoli and Reuter, 
2008). In what was the first attempt to systematically organize knowledge on this topic, Reuter (2014) 
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posited that smugglers’ attempts to minimize risks and maximize profits, geographical proximity and 
social proximity (e.g. migration flows and common language) were the primary drivers of international 
drug trafficking. 
According to a neoclassical approach to crime (Becker, 1968) and rational choice theorists (Barry 
and Hardin, 1982; Cook and Levi, 1990), individuals decide to traffic illicit drugs, or commit any other 
offence, to increase their own utility. That is to say, offenders are rational actors who decide to commit 
an offence when the gains outweigh the losses. In this respect, criminals’ motivations do not differ from 
those who do not commit crimes, nor does their behavior necessarily require ad hoc pathological or 
sociological interpretations (Becker, 1968). Accordingly, illicit flows are more likely to form where 
profits are higher and risks are lower (Caulkins and MacCoun, 2003; Reuter, 2014). Faced with several 
alternatives, then, traffickers are more likely to opt for the route with the lower risk of interdiction and 
the higher return. Therefore, according to this perspective, the higher the economic return per unit sold, 
the higher the probability that any two given countries will form a trading relationship and develop an 
intense trafficking relationship. As a result of this, countries with large and profitable markets are more 
likely to establish a trading relationship. Similarly, the higher the risk of arrest or drug seizure, then the 
lower the quantity of heroin trafficked between any two countries. Opportunities may also drive up 
commission from crimes by creating a crime-prone environment (Felson and Clarke, 1998). For 
example, it has been shown that corruption reduces international legal trades (Anderson and Marcouiller, 
2002); conversely, weak and corrupted institutions can reduce the risks for smugglers and help foster 
illicit drug trafficking between countries. 
According to Reuter’s second assumption, geographical proximity to main consumer or producer 
countries— e.g. Mexico for the US and Venezuela for Colombia— is a crucial risk factor for becoming 
a transshipment country (2014). Geographical distance is one of the key components in the gravity 
model of legal trade. Indeed, scholars have extensively examined the effect of distance on legal trade 
flows and proved that, despite technological innovations, it still has a negative effect on bilateral trade 
between countries (Disdier and Head, 2008). This is because geographical distance increases transport 
and organizational costs, and, in the case of illicit activities, increases the exposure time for the shipment, 
thus making it more vulnerable to the interdiction activities of law enforcement authorities. Accordingly, 
drug flows between countries are likely to be higher if the countries involved in the trade are 
geographically closer. 
The third assumption outlined by Reuter (2014) is that social proximity can facilitate trafficking 
among countries. To illustrate this, he asserts that ethnic groups with a significant role in the import of 
illicit drugs in Europe (e.g. Colombians for cocaine and Albanians for heroin) are characterized by a 
vast migrant community in several European countries. An emergent body of research has investigated 
the role of migration, documenting its positive effect on bilateral legal trade (Rauch, 1999; Rauch and 
Trindade, 2002; Sgrignoli et al., 2015). Immigrants often maintain connections with their home country, 
and thus may help the host country to extend its trading relationships beyond its national borders, as 
migrants’ informal trade networks can facilitate access to valuable information and reduce the barriers 
to trade (Sgrignoli et al., 2015). This factor can be even more significant in the context of international 
drug trafficking, where a lack of reliable information can hamper new suppliers’ access to the market, 
especially in terms of substances like heroin and cocaine (Pacula et al., 2010). 
Historical and cultural roots may also be of benefit to the trade of legal goods (Lee and Park, 2015; 
Rauch, 1999). Similarly, speaking the same language can be an important asset, even an advantage, for 
drug suppliers (Paoli and Reuter, 2008). For instance, suppliers need to come to an agreement on 
quantity, quality and location of the shipment. Further, they may need to deal with hostile situations 
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(e.g. police investigations or the seizure of the shipment) that necessitate the business partners working 
together to find a common solution. Speaking the same language, then, can make negotiations easier, 
increase the trust between the sellers and the buyers, and reduce transaction costs (Ghemawat, 2001; 
Lameli et al., 2013; Sgrignoli et al., 2015). Social factors can thus make two countries closer and directly 
impact both legal and illegal bilateral trade. Resultantly, we expect social proximity to play a pivotal 
role in the trade of heroin between countries. Further, trafficking flows are expected to follow the same 
patterns as migration and colonial relationships. Similarly, heroin is expected to be more likely to be 
traded between countries whose populations speak the same language. 
Data and method 
Dependent variable 
The study focuses on transnational heroin flows between countries. The unit of analysis is thus the dyad, 
i.e. any pair of countries in a weighted network of heroin trafficking involving 61 countries. The 
presence and weights of the edges in the heroin trade network are estimated using a three-step 
methodology developed by the UNODC (2015b). The first step involves identifying the countries 
involved in the heroin trade and the respective trading relationships between them, for the purposes of 
developing a binary network of cross-country heroin trafficking. The second step estimates the total 
quantity of heroin trafficked to Europe. Finally, the third step calculates the quantity of heroin trafficked 
between any pair of countries identified in the first step. That said, this section briefly summarizes the 
main steps of the estimation process; for a more detailed discussion of the methodology, see Annex 1 of 
the UNODC report (2015b, p. 55). 
The first step identifies heroin flows to and within Europe based upon seizure cases. Law enforcement 
agencies, at times, are able to state the origin and/or the destination of the drug shipments they intercept. 
For instance, a seizure of heroin on the border between Serbia and Croatia which is bound for Slovenia 
provides evidence for two connections: one between Serbia and Croatia; and another between Croatia 
and Slovenia (Boivin, 2013). This type of information enables us to identify pairs of trading countries 
and begin to construct the transnational heroin trafficking network (UNODC, 2015b). 
This study mobilises seizure cases between the periods of 2007 and 2012, involving both European 
countries (N=36) and non-European countries (N=25) importing from or exporting to Europe.6 The 
UNODC’s Individual Drug Seizure (IDS) dataset— the widest available dataset on seizure cases— 
provides information about a series of shipments seized by law enforcement agencies; such information 
includes the origin, transit, destination, and weight of the intercepted drug loads. The UNODC 
administrates the Annual Reports Questionnaire (ARQ) to officials of the UN member states and 
supplements the received information with data collated from other international organizations 
(UNODC 2015b). Commonplace misunderstanding of the questionnaire itself, not to mention routine 
compiling errors, necessitate the need to scrupulously check the information reported in the dataset 
(Boivin, 2011). After cleaning the dataset, 10,378 different heroin exchanges were identified in relation 
to 187 pairs of countries.7 Table A1 in the Appendix lists the 61 countries that form the heroin trade 
network under analysis. 
                                                             
6 Countries are labeled as European according to the macro geographical regions identified by the United Nations (UNODC, 
2015c). 
7 Heroin cannot be produced in Europe and, according to the UNODC (2015a), Afghanistan makes up a large share of the 
worldwide opium cultivation, and, as such, is the principal source country for illicit opiates flowing to Europe. 
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The second step estimates the total quantity of heroin trafficked to Europe. In accordance with Paoli 
et al. (2009), this equates to the quantity of heroin consumed and seized in Europe. Consumption rates 
are obtained by multiplying the estimate of the number of heroin users in each country by their estimated 
annual consumption. Prevalence data provided by UNODC and EMCDDA are expedient for estimating 
the number of heroin users (EMCDDA, 2015b; UNODC, 2015d). Resultantly, the current study posits 
that European heroin users consume on average 30 grams of pure heroin per year, which is in line with 
previous estimates by Paoli et al. (2009), which have subsequently been validated by other studies 
(Kilmer et al., 2013). Seizures are then adjusted for purity so as to make estimates comparable across 
countries, before being added to consumption. The overall sum of seizures and consumption for all 
countries included in the analysis composes the estimate of the amount of heroin shipped to Europe.  
Finally, the third step calculates the quantity of heroin passing through each route between pairs of 
countries identified in the first step. This requires: (1) determining the relative weight (%) of each link 
with respect to the other links connecting the same importing country; (2) estimating the total quantity 
of heroin imported by each country; (3) combining these two estimates. In order to estimate the relative 
relevance of the dyads for any importer (𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑗), the volume of the seizures between any two countries 
(𝑆𝑖𝑗) is then divided by the total volume of seizures in the importing country (∑ 𝑆𝑖𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1 ): 
𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑖 ,𝑗 =
𝑆𝑖𝑗
∑ 𝑆𝑖𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
 (3) 
where J is the total number of j countries exporting cocaine to i. The information on seizures 
necessary to produce this estimate comes from the IDS dataset previously used for building the binary 
network. Connections that account for less than 1 per cent of the import of the receiving country are not 
included in the network. Setting this threshold helps to clean out of the network those connections whose 
relevance is marginal and highly volatile. The threshold and the geographical criterion (links to 
European countries) thus mark the boundaries of the heroin trafficking network. 
The total imported volume— which is the sum total of consumption and seizures— is then subdivided 
among the different incoming links according to their relative relevance for the importing country, thus 
providing the final weight of every connection. Fig. 1 represents a simplified illustration of the 
construction of the heroin trafficking network. 
This process of constructing the weighted network is not without its limitations. As aforesaid, seizures 
data are highly imprecise at the best of times, not to mention that UN member states submit information 
about relevant seizure cases on a strictly voluntary basis (Boivin 2014c). Hence, some countries may 
not report information to the ARQ every year, while others may even be reluctant to share information 
about drug seizures. Furthermore, seizures of illicit psychoactive substances, in fact, represent a 
relatively small percentage of the total flows between countries (Crocker et al., 2011; Miron, 2003). 
Consequently, a couple of large seizures are capable of causing significant fluctuations in the overall 
size of interceptions. In turn, some links may be particularly under- or over-represented in the IDS 
depending on the specific year under consideration. Three strategies are adopted to mitigate these 
problems. 
First, the current study uses data accrued over a six-year period (2007-2012), in conjunction with 
examining information provided by both importing and exporting countries, for the strict purpose of 
mitigating the problem of under- or no reporting during some years. Assuming limited variability in 
reporting across this time period, this should enable the study to mitigate consequences stemming from 
both variations in specific country’s border control and exceptional large seizures during this period. 
Second, focusing on European countries, which tend to provide more detailed and reliable information 
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than non-European ones, should help to reduce, but not avoid completely, the risk of omitting significant 
trafficking routes. Third, the estimates of the size of heroin flows between any two countries does not 
solely depend on the relative weights of the different connections, but also on estimated internal 
consumption and exports. 
Fig. 1. Example of the procedure performed in Step 3 of the construction of the heroin trade network 
Step 3.1 Step 3.2 Step 3.3 
   
Letters and squares represent the countries included in the network; the numbers inside the squares represent 
countries’ internal demand for heroin (i.e. consumption and seizures). Arrows represent the presence and direction 
of heroin flows between pairs of countries; numbers parallel to the arrows represent the proportion of heroin 
imported through a link (step 3.1) or the quantity of heroin exchanged by pairs of countries (step 3.3). The thickness 
of the arrows in step 3.3 is proportional to the heroin exchanged along the links. First, the trading relationships 
among countries A, B, C, and D, and the relative weight (%) of an importer’s incoming links with respect to the 
other incoming links of the same importer are identified. According to the IDS dataset, 33% of the heroin shipment 
in country A comes from country D, and the remaining amount from country C. According to the estimate in step 
3.2, country A needs to import 15 tons of heroin to satisfy its internal demand; therefore, 5 tons are imported from 
country D (33%) and 10 tons from country C (67%). Similarly, country C imports only from country D (100%), 
and needs to import enough heroin to satisfy its internal demand (5 tons), as well as 67% of country A’s internal 
demand. Therefore, 15 tons are exchanged between countries D and C. As regards the trading relationship between 
country D and country B, the latter imports only from the former, and has an internal demand of 10 tons. Therefore, 
the estimated quantity of heroin flowing from country D to country B equals 10 tons. Finally, country D needs to 
import (or produce, being the first country along the trafficking route) enough heroin to satisfy its internal demand 
(5 tons) plus 33% of country A’s internal demand (5 tons), 100% of country B’s internal demand (10 tons), and 
100% of country C’s demand (5 tons for country C’s users and 10 tons to be exported to country A). 
Differences in interception effectiveness and in reporting accuracy across countries, as well as 
between different modes of transport in the same country also limit the potential to soundly estimate the 
relative weight of each link. In particular, the adding up of data deriving from both exporters and 
importers introduces a potential bias possibly causing an overestimation of exports for countries with 
high interception rates. The use of data collected from seizures reported by importing countries would 
soften the relevance of the first of these issues; however, due to the scarcity of information provided by 
some countries, this strategy would reduce the number of detectable dyads and undermine our 
understanding of the network.  
The estimates for internal consumption in the 61 countries under analysis also raise some concerns. 
Whilst we assume that heroin users consume an average of 30 pure grams of heroin per year, as estimated 
by Paoli et al. (2009) and confirmed across other studies (Kilmer et al., 2013), overlooking national 
differences in the average consumption per user represents a considerable oversimplification. However, 
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the available information does not allow for precise country-specific estimates. The UNODC (2015b) 
assumes a two-level system of heroin consumption, differentiating between Western and Eastern 
European countries. Although some studies have estimated per capita heroin consumption in specific 
countries (e.g., Gossop et al. 1997; Eisenbach Stangl 2007; Kilmer and Pacula 2009; Eisenbach Stangl 
and Rodigues 2012; Kilmer et al. 2013), it is simply not possible to retrieve country-specific estimates 
for each of the 61 countries involved in the supply of heroin to Europe. Further developments in 
wastewater analysis will hopefully provide new data on drug consumption to be used to estimate 
transnational drug flows between countries. 
Descriptive analyses of the proposed heroin trafficking network are consistent with prior 
representations and traditional perceptions about heroin routes (EMCDDA, 2015c; UNODC 2015a, 
2015b, 2014), and, moreover, appear to support the validity of the methodology adopted for constructing 
the trafficking network. For instance, countries at the forefront of supplying, i.e. those countries close 
to Afghanistan, have a large number of outgoing ties. Hence, Pakistan (out-degree=26), Turkey (22) and 
Bulgaria (15) are the countries with the highest out-degree centrality, thus demonstrating their role as 
exporters. Similarly, consumer countries such as Spain (in-degree=14), Austria (10), Germany and 
Denmark (8) are characterized by a high number of incoming ties, which emphasize their role as 
importers. The trafficking network also foregrounds the strategic role of countries such as the 
Netherlands as a redistribution hub for heroin coming from South-East Europe (Calderoni et al., 2015; 
UNODC, 2014). According to seizures data, the Netherlands is seventh on the list in terms of outgoing 
ties, as well as, with 3.7 tons, the largest exporter of heroin within the EU. Despite several limitations, 
then, the methodology employed here is nevertheless expedient for elaborating a weighted network of 
international heroin trafficking, although future studies should test the robustness of the results against 
other specifications. 
Independent variables 
Independent variables were selected based on the criminological and economic theories discussed in the 
section ‘Determinants and hypotheses,’ as well as on the basis of findings from previous studies on drug 
flows between countries (i.e. Boivin, 2014b). Table 1 lists the independent variables and their sources, 
whereas Table 2 provides descriptive statistics. 
Countries with large and profitable markets are expected to be more likely to establish a trading 
relationship. Therefore, we use the number of users per country as a proxy for a respective country’s 
size in the heroin trade, and test whether the drug flows are driven by economic profit, i.e. to countries 
with large consumer markets. The difference in typical trade prices between any two countries (adjusted 
for purity and measured in USD/kg) and per capita GDP are also included as countries’ structural 
characteristics that might influence heroin flows between any two countries. Data on heroin users and 
prices were retrieved from the UNODC Annual Report Questionnaire (ARQ); data on per capita GDP 
were collected from the World Bank. 
The presence of police forces (rate per 100,000 population) and the seizure rate (quantity of heroin 
seized on trade) within each country are included as nodal attribute effects, whilst their influence is 
tested on the number of incoming ties and the volume of imports.8 The role of criminal opportunities as 
facilitating drug exchanges between countries (Felson and Clarke, 1998) is tested through including 
terms for the level of corruption in each country, as measured by the World Bank, i.e. perceptions of the 
                                                             
8 Seizure rate is calculated in terms of the purity-adjusted quantity of heroin seized per year (average 2009-2012) divided by 
average annual trade of heroin or opium. 
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extent to which public power is exercised for public gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption.9  
Table 1. Independent variables 
Hypothesis Variable Source Period 
Profit Users (ln) UNODC 2009-2012 
Wholesale price mark-
ups (purity-adjusted), 
USD/kg 
Authors’ elaboration on 
UNODC data 
2009-2012 (average) 
GDP (per capita) World Bank 2009-2012 (average) 
Risk of enforcement Police agents, rate per 
100,000 populations 
UNODC 2009-2012 (average) 
 Seizures, rate on trade Authors’ elaboration on 
UNODC data 
2009-2012 (average) 
 Control of corruption World Bank 2009-2012 (average) 
Geographical distance Weighted distance (ln) CEPII N/A 
Border adjacency CEPII N/A 
Social distance Migration flows (stock, 
ln) 
UNGMD 2010 
Language spoken by at 
least 9% of the 
population 
CEPII 2000-2008 
Colonial relationship CEPII N/A 
 
The role of geographical distance is tested by including in the models two matrices of spatial 
proximity as relational attribute effects: one matrix measures the distance between countries, taking into 
consideration the actual distribution of the population of each nation (Mayer and Zignago, 2011);10 the 
other considers two countries as neighbors if they share a border.  The influence of migration, language, 
and colonial relationship is tested by including edge covariates for migration flows among countries 
from the United Nations Global Migration Database (UNGMD), the presence of a language spoken by 
at least 9 per cent of the population in any two given countries, and any past colonial relationship 
between any two countries. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of independent variables 
Nodal attribute Min. Max. Mean St. Dev. 
Users 155 3150700 202799 554121 
Wholesale prices (purity-
adjusted), USD/kg 
3906 474127 72721 84488 
GDP (per capita) 518 106811 24704 24760 
Police agents, rate per 100,000 
populations 
87.82 890.33 341.99 150.93 
Seizures, rate on trade 0.00 0.47 0.05 0.08 
Control of corruption -1.52 2.44 0.39 1.15 
                                                             
9 The control of corruption index ranges from -2.5 (weak control) to +2.5 (strong control). The reciprocal of the index is used 
in the analysis, so that higher values indicate higher corruption levels. 
10 The distance between countries is based on the Institute for Research on International Economy (CEPII) weighted distance, 
which calculates bilateral distances between the biggest cities of any two countries, and weights inter-city distances by the 
share of the city in the overall country’s population (Mayer and Zignago, 2011). 
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Relational attribute Size Edge count Density Mean degree 
Weighted distance 61 3660 - - 
Border adjacency 61 80 0.087 2.69 
Migration flows (stock) 61 2280 0.623 44.43 
Language spoken by at least 9% 
of the population 
61 109 0.060 3.61 
Colonial relationship 61 43 0.046 1.41 
Models estimation 
A series of gravity and latent space models are specified in order to test the effects of the independent 
variables on the presence of a trading relationship and the amount of heroin traded between any two 
countries. The natural logarithm of the amount of heroin traded is used as the response. The natural 
logarithm transformation is also used for the number of users, and for the matrices of migration flows 
and weighted distance. All nodal attribute effects refer to importing countries, whereas the 
characteristics of exporting countries are not included in the models, albeit with the exception of the 
number of users.  
First, we estimate a gravity model taking the form of the linear model in Eq. (1), where 𝑙𝑛(𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖 ,𝑗) 
is the natural logarithm of heroin traded between any two countries i and j, 𝑀𝑖  and 𝑀𝑗  are the respective 
sender and receiver economic masses, 𝐷𝑖 ,𝑗 the distance between i and j, 𝑍𝑖,𝑗  other covariates, and 𝜖𝑖 ,𝑗 
the residual error. The economic masses are proxied by the number of drug users. 𝑍𝑖,𝑗  comprise all 
independent variables listed in Table 1, i.e. the per capita GDP, the rate of police agents per 100,000 
population, the rate of seizures on consumption, and the level of corruption in the importing countries, 
as well as wholesale price mark-ups, migration flows, common language, and colonial relationships 
between i and j. In accordance with Hoff and Ward’s approach (Hoff and Ward, 2004; Ward and Hoff, 
2007), we analyze the residuals from the gravity model and we check for higher order dependencies in 
the data. 
Second, we estimate latent space position models, adopting a two-step approach to estimate the 
parameters (Mazur et al., 2015). First, latent space position models are utilized in order to model the 
presence of a tie between any two given countries in the heroin trade network. Second, the amount of 
drugs traded between any two countries is modelled, provided that a trading relationship is in place. 
Together, the results provide information on the determinants of the heroin trade network in Europe. 
The analyses were performed using the ‘latentnet’ package (Krivitsky and Handcock, 2015, 2008) in R 
(R Core Team, 2015). The fixed effects are selected based on backward elimination via BIC (Mazur et 
al., 2015; Schwarz, 1978). Random sender and receiver effects and latent positions are also included in 
the models. 
Results and discussion 
The results of the linear model in Eq. (1) are presented in Table 3. The model uses the number of users 
per country as a proxy for a respective country’s size to test whether the drug flows are driven to 
countries with large consumer markets. The number of users in the importing countries and shared 
borders are statistically significant, and the signs of the coefficients are positive, as expected. The 
estimated parameters for migration flows, common language, and colonial relationship are also positive 
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and significant, indicating the influence of social proximity upon heroin trafficking. The parameter for 
corruption is also positive and statistically significant, suggesting an association between the level of 
corruption in importing countries and heroin flows. Instead, trade price mark-ups, police agents, and per 
capita GDP do not have any impact upon a country’s tendency to trade with other countries.  
Table 3. Coefficients and standard errors from the gravity model of the heroin trade network 
 𝛃 Standard Error 
(Intercept) -0.045  0.210 
Users (sender, ln) -0.007  0.011 
Users (receiver, ln) 0.031 ** 0.011 
Weighted distance (ln) -0.026  0.016 
Border adjacency 0.942 *** 0.116 
Police agents (receiver) 0.000  0.000 
Seizures (receiver) -0.507  0.260 
Corruption (receiver) 0.090 * 0.043 
Trade price mark-ups 0.000 *** 0.000 
GDP/capita (receiver) 0.000  0.000 
Migration flows (ln) 0.064 *** 0.007 
Spoken language 0.249 ** 0.095 
Colony 0.431 ** 0.149 
Residual error is 1.282 on 3708 degrees of freedom. 
Since each of the 61 countries constitutive of the heroin trade network are represented several times 
in the dataset, both in their dual-role as importer and exporter, the residuals are likely to display a certain 
amount of structure. In accordance with Hoff and Ward’s approach, we analyze the residuals from the 
gravity model with the number of users using a ‘row and column effect model’ that fits additive exporter 
and importer effects for each country (Hoff and Ward, 2004; Ward and Hoff, 2007).11 Fig. 2 shows the 
fitted values for these coefficients. The top left panel shows that Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Pakistan, and 
Turkey export more than any other countries within the heroin trade network that have similar 
explanatory variables. The top right panel shows the magnitude of importer residual effects. Spain and 
the United Arab Emirates, in particular, import more heroin than anticipated based upon the linear model 
specified in Eq. (1). Although not at the same levels of the network of legal international trade analyzed 
by Ward and Hoff (2007), the results nonetheless show that there is some degree of structure that cannot 
be explained by the gravity model. 
  
                                                             
11 The ‘row and column effects’ model can be expressed as: 𝜖̂𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑎𝑖+ 𝑏𝑗+ 𝛾𝑖,𝑗, where i and j range over the indices of the 
countries (Ward and Hoff, 2007). 
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Fig. 2. Residual importer and exporter effects for each country within the heroin trade network 
Residual exporter effects Residual importer effects 
  
 
In the top panel, the exporter and importer effects are ordered from the lowest to the highest. The black line identifies the  
normal distribution, whereas the grey area identifies the 95% confidence interval. Colors are indexed by the map in the bottom 
panel, in which proximate countries have similar colors. 
Higher order dependencies— i.e. reciprocity, transitivity, balance, and clusterability— are also likely 
to be present in relational data (Hoff et al., 2002; Hoff and Ward, 2004; Ward and Hoff, 2007). Again 
following Hoff and Ward’s lead, we represent the residuals from the ‘row and column effects’ model as 
‘the inner product of exporter- and importer-specific vectors of latent attributes, plus a disturbance term’ 
(2007, p. 164). The inner product captures the dependencies among the countries trading heroin to and 
within Europe.12 Fig. 3 displays the multiplicative effects of this, as countries in the same geographic 
area are represented in similar colors. If after controlling for the exporter and importer effects the trade 
between any two countries is higher than predicted by the gravity model, then those two countries will 
have similar vectors of latent attributes, and, thus, appear closer in Fig. 3. In accordance with Ward and 
Hoff’s (2007) results for legal trade, countries in the same geographic area tend to cluster together 
despite the inclusion of geographical distance as a covariate in the model. Specifically, central European 
countries such as France, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland, the UK, and the Netherlands are clustered in the 
top right quadrant displaying multiplicative effects for importers, whereas post-Soviet states (Tajikistan, 
Kirgizstan, Uzbekistan, Russia) are clustered in the lower left quadrant. This suggests that the data 
displays higher-order patterns. Consequently, we must turn to latent space position models in order to 
                                                             
12 For a systematic discussion of this method, please see Hoff (2005), and Ward and Hoff (2007). 
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model the probability of a trading relationship between any two countries as a function of the covariates 
and the distance between their latent space positions, thus taking into account the interdependencies 
among observations. 
Fig. 3. Residual multiplicative effects for exporters (b) and importers (c) 
(a) (b) (c) 
 
  
In panels (b) and (c) colors are indexed by the map in panel (a), in which proximate countries have similar colors. The map in 
the left panel is the same as the map in the bottom panel in Fig. 2. 
The results of the latent space position models for both the presence and volume of heroin flows are 
presented in Table 4. Corruption and geographical proximity are shown to be among the principal factors 
shaping the heroin trafficking network both to and within Europe. Corruption, in particular, has an 
important impact on the structure of the network. That is to say, higher levels of corruption in a country 
increase the probability of it becoming an importer. This is because corrupted officials facilitate the 
smuggling of illicit goods and ensure traffickers impunity. Therefore, corruption helps to reduce non-
monetary costs by providing traffickers with protection against arrests and seizures. The other variables 
associated with risks do not appear to play a contributory role in the heroin trafficking network. For 
instance, the coefficient for the number of police agents per inhabitant is not statistically significant. 
Further, seizures in importing countries do not affect the formation of trade relationships among 
countries, nor the quantity of heroin exchanges, and were thus excluded from the final models. These 
results, then, do not support the hypothesis that traffickers favor countries with lower levels of 
enforcement and lower risks of arrest and interception of heroin shipments (Hernandez and Rudolph, 
2015; Reuter and Kleiman, 1986). 
Trafficking is more likely to occur, and more likely to involve large volumes of heroin, between 
geographically proximate countries. Coefficients are higher when modelling the presence of heroin 
flows; hence, geographical proximity has a bigger influence on the creation of a link between any two 
countries, than on the amount of heroin exchanged between the two. In contrast, sharing a border does 
not influence the quantity of heroin exchanged, nor the formation of new ties. The gravity model also 
postulates that a country’s size is directly associated with outgoing and incoming heroin flows. However, 
when we take into account higher order dependencies, the number of users in importing and exporting 
countries does not appear to affect either the presence or weight of ties in the heroin trade network, as 
the estimates for number of users are not statistically significant. The other variables related to rewards 
(i.e. trade price mark-ups and per capita GDP) similarly do not appear to affect either the presence or 
weight of ties in the heroin trade network, and, as such, were excluded from the final models selected 
based on backward elimination of fixed effects via BIC. 
There does appear to be evidence that social proximity does influence traffickers’ decisions about 
transportation routes. For instance, migration flows between any two given countries are associated with 
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a higher probability of forming a trafficking relationship, but not necessarily with the quantity of heroin 
exchanged, whereas past colonial relationships are associated with higher volumes of heroin flows. The 
effect of the past colonial relationship is limited to the volume of heroin flows, with the variable only 
affecting the amount of drug exchanged, not the presence of a tie. Once a trading relationship between 
any two countries is established however, then the presence of a past colonial relationship between the 
exporter and the importer does positively affect the quantity of heroin exchanged. The matrix that 
identifies the presence of a language spoken by at least 9 per cent of the population in any two countries  
is not associated with heroin flows, and, as such, the variable was excluded from the final models. In 
illicit markets, where individuals work under the constant threat of law enforcement and without the 
protection of any legal authority, social ties represent valuable resources for mutual trust (Paoli, 2002; 
Reuter, 1985). Social proximity would thus appear important in determining the direction and volume 
of heroin flows towards the European market. 
Table 4. Coefficients and standard errors from latent space position models of the heroin trade network 
 Dependent variable 
 Presence of heroin flows Volume of heroin flows 
Fixed effects Coefficient (Standard Error) Coefficient (Standard Error) 
Constant -0.085  (0.631) 2.724 *** (0.382) 
Users (sender, ln) 0.059  (0.097) -0.038  (0.031) 
Users (receiver, ln) 0.156  (0.117) 0.086  (0.058) 
Weighted distance (ln) -0.598 *** (0.172) -0.190 ** (0.055) 
Border adjacency 0.551  (0.478) 0.232  (0.133) 
Police agents (receiver) -  - 0.000  (0.001) 
Seizures (receiver) -  - -  - 
Corruption (receiver) 0.952 *** (0.302) 0.192  (0.162) 
Trade price mark-ups -  - -  - 
GDP/capita (receiver) -  - -  - 
Migration flows (ln) 0.183 ** (0.061) -  - 
Spoken language -  - -  - 
Colony 0.657  (0.621) 0.360 * (0.175) 
Random effects Coefficient Coefficient 
Sender variance 2.314 1.338 
Receiver variance 0.977 0.707 
Latent space position 
variance 
1.949 2.153 
Signifiance codes: ‘***’ 0.001; ‘**’ 0.01; ‘*’ 0.05. 
Finally, actor-specific random effects are included in the models, accounting for the heterogeneity of 
countries in regards to both incoming and outgoing ties and edge weights. Fig. A1 in the Appendix 
shows the plot of the latent space positions of the 61 countries involved in heroin trafficking, satisfying 
the Minimum Kullback-Leibler (MKL) divergence. In the model looking at the presence of heroin flows, 
there are several groups of countries that have similar characteristics based on their relative position in 
the network, but only partially overlap geographically. In the model looking at the amount of heroin 
exchanged, a large number of countries share similar positions in the network. Countries such as Spain, 
the Netherlands and Turkey, as well as Bulgaria, Germany and Austria, are seen to act as hubs in the 
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trade network, thus differentiating themselves from the majority of countries involved in heroin 
trafficking in Europe. 
Consequently, the findings of this study partly confirm those of previous research on drug trade 
networks and their determinants. Geographical and social proximity do operate as fertile ground for the 
formation of heroin flows. This is due, in part, to the fact that the presence of ethnic communities and 
past colonial relationships can reduce the organizational costs of illicit trades, and thus favor the 
formation and exploitation of illicit trading relationships among countries (Paoli and Reuter, 2008). 
Conversely, the ability to communicate via the same language does not have a significant effect on the 
likelihood of forming new trading relationships, nor does it increase the amount of heroin exchanged.  
Perhaps somewhat unsurprisingly, heroin traffickers tend to travel relatively short distances when 
moving the drug from country to country (UNODC, 2014). This can increase the time needed to move 
the load to its destination but, more importantly, keeps the level of sophistication required for the 
shipments simple, in turn, reducing the risk of interception and likelihood of arrest for traffickers. 
Opportunism also appears to drive heroin flows towards countries where regulation of corruption is 
weak. Corruption was found to be a relevant factor in reducing legal trade (Anderson and Marcouiller, 
2002) and, similarly, it is crucial in fostering the exchange of illicit goods between countries. Somewhat 
surprisingly, other variables originally included within the analysis do not appear to account for the 
pattern of the heroin trade network. For example, variables associated with risks (i.e., police agents and 
seizures) and rewards (i.e., price mark-ups, per capita GDP) are neither significantly associated with the 
presence of heroin flows, nor with the amount of heroin exchanged between countries. 
The results also show that one of the main limitations of gravity models fitted using OLS— i.e. the 
assumption that all observations are independent— is difficult to sustain even in the case of transnational 
drug flows. Indeed, in our analysis we found country-specific exporter and importer effects that were 
ignored in these models. Latent space position models take into account interdependencies among 
observations, thus providing a promising modelling strategy to scholars working with weighted 
networks, although further research is needed to simultaneously model the presence of a tie between 
any two countries and the amount of drugs traded. Further research is also needed to compare different 
statistical models for social networks (e.g. different classes of exponential random graph models and 
latent space position models) and to explain any possible differences in the results. 
Conclusions 
This paper has modelled transnational drug flows as a directed, weighted network in order to identify 
the principal determinants of heroin flows both to and within Europe. Latent space position models 
enabled us to capture the complexity of the phenomenon by modelling both the presence and the amount 
of heroin flows between countries. They also afforded us to capture higher order interdependencies 
among observations in the analysis of bilateral illicit trade among European and non-European 
countries. A similar approach was utilized in order to analyze bilateral legal commerce (Howell, 2013; 
Ward et al., 2013) and investments (Mazur et al., 2015), and also proved its expedience for analyzing 
illegal smuggling of drugs across countries. 
The results show that geographical and social proximity increase the likelihood of observing heroin 
exchanges between countries. Countries with high levels of corruption are more likely to participate in 
drug trafficking as transit countries, and thus have more incoming ties. Risks and rewards do not seem 
to play an integral role in constructing heroin trade among countries. In fact, the presence of police 
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forces and their ability to seize drug shipments, the effect of price mark-ups, and the number of users in 
transit and destination countries have been shown to be not statistically significant. 
Hence, this study provides several recommendations for policy makers and law enforcement 
authorities. Heroin still makes up a significant share of Europe’s drug-related health and social costs 
(EMCDDA and EUROPOL, 2016), with the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction 
(EMCDDA) estimating the total drug-related public expenditure in Europe as ranging from EUR 28 to 
40 billion. Moreover, prisons and police services make up about 47 per cent of public expenditure under 
the auspices of public order and safety (EMCDDA, 2008). This is why the disruption of cross-border 
illicit drug trafficking represents a key priority in the field of drug supply reduction, as outlined in the 
EU Drugs Strategy (2013-20). However, there is little evidence that this approach is successful in either 
reducing the availability of heroin or in disrupting international flows (Collins, 2014). This study puts 
forward alternative approaches to affect the international flows of heroin, such as strategies aimed at 
increasing resilience against corruption, particularly along the borders, in order to prevent countries 
from becoming a part of main trafficking routes in the first place. 
This study also shows the potential benefits of applying social network analysis to the study of 
international drug trafficking and its manifold determinants. It does so by demonstrating the relevance 
of including edge weights in statistical models for drug flow networks, since both the effect and the 
significance of coefficients may vary when the amount of drug traded is considered. Future studies could 
seek to refine these models, both by introducing new independent variables and improving the 
operationalization of those already included within this analysis, as well as the heroin trafficking 
network itself. Further developments in statistical models for social networks may provide the 
possibility to jointly model the presence and amount of drug, rather than having to estimate two separate 
models. Furthermore, other modelling options may soon become available which allow for comparisons 
between different models. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Countries of the heroin trade network 
Country Country code Country Country code 
Afghanistan AFG Kazakhstan KAZ 
Albania ALB Kenya KEN 
United Arab Emirates ARE Kyrgyzstan KGZ 
Australia AUS Kosovo under UNSCR 
1244 
KOS 
Austria AUT Lebanon LBN 
Belgium BEL Luxembourg LUX 
Bulgaria BGR Latvia LVA 
Bahrain BHR Macedonia (TFYR) MKD 
Bosnia and Herzegovina BIH Malta MLT 
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of) 
BOL Montenegro MNE 
Brazil BRA Mauritius MUS 
Canada CAN Nigeria NGA 
Switzerland CHE Netherlands NLD 
Czech Republic CZE Norway NOR 
Germany DEU Oman OMN 
Denmark DNK Pakistan PAK 
Dominican Republic DOM Poland POL 
Ecuador ECU Portugal PRT 
Spain ESP Qatar QAT 
Finland FIN Romania ROU 
France FRA Russian Federation RUS 
United Kingdom GBR Serbia SRB 
Greece GRC Slovakia SVK 
Croatia HRV Slovenia SVN 
Hungary HUN Sweden SWE 
India IND Thailand THA 
Ireland IRL Tajikistan TJK 
Iran (Islamic Republic 
of) 
IRN Turkey TUR 
Iceland ISL Ukraine UKR 
Italy ITA Uzbekistan UZB 
Japan JPN   
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Fig. A1. MKL latent space positions for the presence (left) and volume (right) of heroin flows 
MKL latent positions for the presence of heroin flows MKL latent positions for the volume of heroin flows 
 
 
 
 
 
